The aim of this paper is to assess whether Kant's moral theory is suitable to deal with our obligations to take care of nonhuman animals and the environment. Kant's ethics distinguishes persons, that is, rational beings with unconditional values who are considered as ends in themselves, from things, which have only relative worth. In relation to nature as a whole and to nonrational beings, Kant argues that we have only indirect duties or duties with regard to them. According to some philosophers, Kant's ethics has anthropocentric starting points which lead to speciesist conclusions. This paper will argue that indirect duties can be in accordance with nonhuman interests, such as the suffering of nonhuman animals, the preservation of species and ecosystems, and so on. Thus Kant's moral philosophy may contribute to environmental ethics because it justifies at least animal welfare and environmental protections as constraints on unrestricted human action.
Introduction
According to some philosophers, Kant's ethics has anthropocentric starting points (O'Neill 1998; Altman 2011 ) which lead to speciesist conclusions (Singer 2009) . One of Kant's most familiar statements is that rational beings have wills because they are able to choose on the basis of principles and to establish ends provided by reason, rather than being entirely motivated by natural desires and impulses (GMS, AA 04: 412; TL, 2 . Kant's exposition of the Formula of Humanity in Groundwork distinguishes persons (rational beings considered as ends in themselves, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means) from things, which, he says, "have only a relative worth" (GMS, AA 04: 428) . Besides that, Kant says in the Doctrine of Virtue that human beings have duties with regard to or indirect duties in relation to nature and nonrational beings. For these reasons, Kant's moral theory is not considered suitable to deal with questions about how we should treat nonhuman living animals and the natural environment. This paper will consider both the strengths and weaknesses of To understand Kant's account of the value of nature and rational beings, we must consider two important concepts that appear both in Groundwork (GMS) and in the Metaphysics of Morals (MS), namely, "will" and "end". Kant says that everything in nature works according to laws, but "only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason" (GMS, AA 04: 413) . That is to say, the will is the power within us to produce practical results (actions) from the demands of reason. Animals follow their desires and inclinations to eat, to avoid harm, and to reproduce. Plants do not have a nervous system, and their responses to stimuli like light or touch are slow. But neither animals nor plants are capable of acting on the basis of reason. Kant explains why the will should be determined by an end:
The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found only in rational beings. Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an end (Zweck), and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings (GMS, AA 04: 427).
The will of a rational being is always directed towards an end that he gives himself. Thus, according to Kant, the Categorical Imperative has a form and also has a matter, that is, an end.
Having clarified the relation of the will to the purpose of pure reason, we can now properly analyze the value of nature and nonrational animals. As we have seen, the will of a rational being is always directed towards an end that he gives himself. In this way, Kant argues that the end as an objective principle will be rational nature: "Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions (…) always be regarded at the same time as an end" (GMS, AA 04: 428). After this passage, Kant presents the distinction between persons and things:
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect) (GMS, AA 04: 428).
In condition for something to be considered an end in itself is to have dignity:
But that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity. Now, morality is the condition under with alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity. (GMS, AA 06: 435).
One must treat rational nature as an end in itself because it has dignity. However, recent naturalistic interpretations of Kant's philosophy may bring new insights on this issue. Frederick
Rauscher argues that in a naturalistic Kantian ethics there is no place for any intrinsic value property (Rauscher 2015, p. 209) 2 Indirect duties to minerals, plants and to nonrational animals According to Kant, the most fundamental division among ethical duties is between duties towards ourselves and duties towards others. Duties to ourselves are those required on account of respect for the humanity in our own person. We respect humanity in our own person by
promoting the end of our own natural or moral perfection (TL 6:385-387). All duties towards others are required to promote the end of their happiness. We respect humanity in others by promoting the ends set by rational beings, which compose the idea of a person's happiness (TL 06: 388). Duties to others are further distinguished into duties of respect and duties of love (TL 06: 448-450).
Kant argues that there can be no direct duties in relation to nature as a whole and to nonrational beings . However, we have indirect duties or duties with regard to them. According to him, these duties appear to be duties toward them because of an "amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection", that is, a misunderstanding that leads us to conflate a "duty to with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings" (TL AA 06: 442). They can refer to objects other than persons or to objects that are indeed persons, but quite imperceptible ones, that is, those who cannot be presented to the outer senses: "The first (nonhuman) objects can be mere inorganic matter (minerals), or matter organized for reproduction though still without sensation (plants), or the part of nature endowed with sensation and choice (animals).
The second, (superhuman) objects can be thought as spiritual beings (angels, God)" (TL AA 06: 442). Indirect duties can be defined as duties that moral agents have regarding nonhuman animals and the environment because of their relationship to people's interests or rights. These duties are regarding nonhuman animals or the environment, but not to them (Sandler 2017) .
In relation to minerals and plants, Kant recognizes that the appreciation of beauty in inanimate nature is required for morality: "A propensity for wanton destruction of what is beautiful in inanimate nature (spiritus destructionis) is opposed to a human being's duty to himself" (TL AA 06: 443). For Kant, aesthetic appreciation of plant life and nonliving natural entities can help foster dispositions that make one more likely to fulfill one's duties to human beings. So spiritus destructionis weakens a disposition of sensibility that greatly promotes morality or at least paves the way for it: "the disposition, namely, to love something (e.g., beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauty of plants) even apart from any intention to use it" (TL, AA 06: 443). Moreover, according to the notes of Vigilantius, Kant claimed similarly that, regarding nonanimal nature, moral agents have "a duty only to have no animus destructionum, i. e., no inclination to destroy without need the useable objects of nature" (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 709). This is because "the need to love other things outside us must not be self-serving" and because one "cannot be more disinterestedly satisfied, from a moral point of view, than when this inclination is directed upon lifeless objects [...]" (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 710). As we can see, Kant holds both that not caring about the destruction of beautiful natural entities "is opposed to a human being's duty to himself" and that humans have "a duty only to TONETTO, M. C. Kant's concept of indirect duties have no animus destructionum" (V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 709). Being moral includes regarding oneself and nature in a manner that is not merely self-serving. Appreciation of beautiful flora and nonliving entities cultivates a similar disposition, since one thereby admires beautiful entities apart from their propensity to serve one's own interests. According to Allen Wood, Kant says that our duty to further our own moral perfection requires us to appreciate and preserve natural beauty for its own sake. He says that, "Kant is apparently acknowledging that something, namely natural beauty, can have worth for its own sake (and not merely as a means)
without being rational nature in the person of some rational being" (Wood, 1998, p. 200) . This fits well with Kant's claim that moral agents ought to view one another as deserving of respect, treating others as ends-in-themselves rather than as mere means.
In relation to duties to nonrational living beings, Kant's argument seems to be that one should not be cruel to animals because this makes one more likely to be cruel to humans. Kant writes:
With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and cruel treatment of animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural disposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other people (TL, AA 06: 443)
Kant says that human beings ought to abstain from the violent and cruel treatment of animals because such treatment will make humans more likely to fail in their direct duties to one another.
Contemporary proponents of this argument frequently point out that perpetrators of violent crimes sometimes have a prior history of violence towards animals. Kant mentions the fact that, in England, butchers or surgeons were not allowed to serve on juries because their profession was thought to inure them to death (V-Mo/Collins, AA 27: 460). However, some ethicists maintain that there is no necessary connection between cruelty to animals and a reduction in one's sensitivity to human suffering (Svoboda 2015, p. 147; Sandler 2017, p. 111-112) There is also the question of whether Kant's ethics is anthropocentric.
Anthropocentrism is the view that the criterion for having inherent worth is to be a member of the species Homo sapiens, and that all and only human beings are directly morally considerable.
Conversely, the different versions of nonanthropocentrism (ratiocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism) represent the view that at least some nonhumans have inherent worth, and several criteria have been used to decide which nonhumans should be directly morally considerable. Allen Wood thinks that Kant's ethical theory is logocentric, by which he means a position "based on the idea that rational nature, and it alone, has absolute and unconditional value" (Wood 1998, p. 189) . Some environmental ethicists call this position "ratiocentrism", that is, "the view that only robustly rational beings are directly morally considerable. This includes cognitively developed humans, but would also encompass robustly rational artificial intelligences or members of other species" (Sandler 2017, p. 95) . Matthew Altman points out that the implications of logocentrism are the same as those of anthropocentrism: "human beings are included but plants, animals, and ecosystems are excluded from direct moral considerability" (Altman, 2011, p. 16 ). Wood, however, stresses that the problem with Kant's views on how we should treat nonhuman entities arises not from logocentrism, but from Kant's support of a personification principle, that is, "the idea that humanity or rational nature has a moral claim on us only in the person of a being who actually possesses it" (Wood 1998, p. 193 ).
The personification principle makes a claim about the beings to whom duties or rights may be owed. It implies that "there can be no duties toward animals, toward nature as a whole, or indeed toward any nonrational being at all" (Wood 1998, p. 194) . Wood says that Kant mistakenly thought that he could not establish any duties to nonrational beings because he also adopted the personification principle, by which every duty is a duty owed to some person (Wood 1998, p. 196) . The personification principle holds that the logocentric claim (only rational nature has absolute and unconditional value and should be treated as an end in itself) applies only to humanity in someone's person. Onora O'Neill comments on Wood's thesis saying that
Even if in practice Kant thinks that there are duties to infants or impaired humans, who are not currently rational, he should not have done so, and he was correctly following the implications of the personification principle in denying that there are human duties to non-human animals, or to other parts of nonrational nature, or to supernatural beings (…). It is the personification principle rather than logocentrism which, as Wood views it, leads Kant to speciesist conclusions (O'Neill 1998, 220-221) .
Thus, according to O'Neill, Kant is only committed to the personification principle.
TONETTO, M. C. Kant's concept of indirect duties
Wood says that we should reject the personification principle. According to him: "a logocentric ethics, which grounds all duties on the value of human or rational nature, should not be committed to the personification principle" (Wood 1998, p. 197) . Then, he argues that
Kant's moral theory should be modified and extended to accommodate moral concern for nonhumans: "we should also respect rational nature in the abstract, which entails respecting fragments of it or necessary conditions of it, even where these are not found in fully rational beings or persons" (Wood 1998, p. 198 ). Wood thinks that we ought to give nonhuman animals moral consideration because they have elements of or necessary conditions for rationality.
However, one could object that it is not clear whether we can attribute fragments of rationality to all nonhuman animals which have desires, sentience and some ability to initiate action. As we will see, Wood's interpretation of the logocentric principle may not be extended to species that do not have rationality.
Christine Korsgaard also tries to extend Kant's philosophy to justify direct duties to animals. Differently from Wood, however, she says that those caveats concerning which beings have humanity (infants, the severely intellectually disabled, those with incurable mental illnesses, those with dementia and so on) are misguided. According to her, in Kant's conception of rationality, most of those beings who are nearly rational are indeed rational beings: "Some of them are, for various reasons, unable to reason well; some of them are at stages of their lives when reason is undeveloped, inert, or non-functional. These conditions (…) do not affect their standing as rational beings under the Kantian conception" (Korsgaard, 2004, p. 82) . She says that despite appearances, and despite what Kant thought, "his arguments reveal the ground of our obligations to the other animals" (Korsgaard, 2004, p. 82) . However, differently from Wood who thinks that we ought to give nonhuman animals moral consideration because they have fragments of rationality, Korsgaard claims that human beings have direct duties to animals in virtue of each animal's natural good. She writes that an animal is an organic system to whom its own good matters, an organic system that welcomes, desires, enjoys, and pursues its good. We could even say that an animal is an organic system that matters to itself, for it pursues its own good for its own sake (…). When we say that something is naturally good for an animal, we mean that it is good from its point of view (Korsgaard, 2004, p.102-103 ).
Animals do not give themselves moral law because they are not self-legislating agents, but they are worthy of moral consideration by those who do. Korsgaard holds that human beings through their legislative wills confer normative value on their own natural good as animal beings and on the natural good of nonhuman animals as well. According to her "[i]n taking ourselves to be TONETTO, M. C. Kant's concept of indirect duties ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself is the source of normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own legislation makes it so. And that is why we have duties to the other animals" (Korsgaard 2004, p. 106 The point I am making is easiest to see, and hardest to deny, in the case of many human beings (in the nontechnical sense) who lack 'humanity' (in the technical sense), and therefore must fail (technically) to be persons at all. They include small children and people who have severe mental impairments or diseases which deprive them, either temporarily or permanently, of the capacity to set ends according to reason. Clearly Kant would not want to say that such human beings are mere things, which are to be treated only as means. The important thing, though, is not what Kant would want to say, but rather what is required by a reasonable interpretation of his basic principle that rational nature should be respected as an end in itself (WOOD, 1998, p. 198) .
The extension of the scope of moral concern for rational nature to those beings who, in Wood's terms, exhibit 'fragments of rationality', but are not currently persons in Kant' 
